By Dr Blessing Vava
Hardly a month passes without an African government unveiling an artificial intelligence strategy, commissioning a data centre or announcing a partnership with a global technology company. Zimbabwe is no exception. From the digitisation of government services to the growing use of AI in universities, banks, newsrooms and even Parliament, artificial intelligence has firmly entered our national vocabulary. Across the continent, Kenya is consolidating its position as a technology hub, Rwanda continues to champion digital innovation, Nigeria's technology ecosystem is attracting global investment, while South Africa remains home to some of Africa's leading AI research institutions according to recent assessments by the World Bank, UNESCO, and the Oxford Insights Government AI Readiness Index. On the surface, these developments suggest that Africa is finally claiming its place in the global digital economy.
Whereas beneath this optimism lies a more fundamental question that receives far less attention: whose intelligence are we actually adopting? More importantly, who determines how that intelligence understands African societies, interprets African realities and increasingly shapes African decision-making?
These are not abstract philosophical questions. Artificial intelligence is becoming the invisible infrastructure of the twenty-first century. As Mustafa Suleyman (2023) argues in The Coming Wave, AI is becoming a general-purpose technology comparable to electricity and the internet. It increasingly influences how governments deliver public services, how businesses allocate resources, how financial institutions assess risk, how news is produced and consumed, and how citizens interact with the digital world. If electricity powered the industrial age, artificial intelligence is powering the age of intelligent decision-making. As The Coming Wave argues, artificial intelligence is emerging as a general-purpose technology comparable to electricity and the internet—one that will reshape virtually every sector of society.
For that reason, the global contest has moved well beyond debates about internet connectivity or digital infrastructure. The strategic question is no longer simply who owns fibre-optic cables or data centres. It is who develops the algorithms, controls the data, trains the models and establishes the rules that govern artificial intelligence. In short, the struggle is shifting from ownership of infrastructure to ownership of intelligence.
In my previous Thursday Briefing, I argued that digital sovereignty cannot be reduced to the ownership of technological infrastructure. The concept has also gained prominence in European Union digital policy debates and UNESCO's work on digital governance. A country may host its own data centres yet remain dependent on foreign software, foreign platforms and foreign algorithms. Ownership without agency is simply another form of dependence. Artificial intelligence extends that argument even further. If digital sovereignty concerns control over digital infrastructure, then the next frontier is what I describe as cognitive sovereignty—the capacity of societies to produce, shape and govern the intelligence that increasingly mediates political, economic and social life.
This idea builds directly on my doctoral concept of geosociotechnopolitics, which argues that technology, society and political power have become inseparable. In today's world, power is exercised not only through territory, military capability or economic strength, but increasingly through algorithms, platforms, data and artificial intelligence. AI is therefore more than another technological innovation; it is becoming a geopolitical and governance instrument that quietly redistributes power from public institutions to the technological systems shaping everyday life.
Zimbabwe already provides important examples of this transformation. Banks use machine learning to detect fraud, newsrooms rely on AI-assisted transcription and translation, universities are grappling with generative AI in teaching and research, while farmers increasingly access AI-powered weather and agricultural applications. These innovations undoubtedly improve efficiency, but they also reveal a deeper reality: much of the intelligence driving these systems is designed elsewhere, trained on datasets that seldom reflect African realities and governed by priorities that are rarely African. Similar trends have been documented by UNDP Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe's National ICT Policy. These trends are consistent with Zimbabwe's National ICT Policy and recent assessments by UNDP Zimbabwe, which identify artificial intelligence and digital transformation as increasingly important components of the country's development agenda.
This should concern us not because foreign technology is inherently problematic, but because history demonstrates that technological dependence often produces economic and political dependence. During colonialism, Africa exported raw materials while importing manufactured goods. Today, the continent increasingly generates vast quantities of digital data—from mobile money, healthcare, agriculture, satellite imagery and social media—yet much of the intelligence derived from that data is processed elsewhere before being sold back to African societies as commercial AI services. Scholars such as Nick Couldry and Ulises A. Mejias describe this phenomenon as data colonialism—a new form of extraction in which data, rather than land or minerals, becomes the principal resource from which value is generated.
Africa's strategic importance in the AI age extends beyond data. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and the African Development Bank (AfDB), Africa occupies a central position in global critical mineral supply chains that underpin the digital economy. The continent is the world's principal supplier of many of the minerals essential to artificial intelligence and advanced computing. The Democratic Republic of Congo dominates global cobalt production; South Africa and Gabon supply much of the world's manganese; South Africa and Zimbabwe hold some of the largest platinum group metal reserves; Mozambique and Madagascar are major graphite producers; Zimbabwe has emerged as one of Africa's leading lithium producers alongside Namibia, while Zambia remains indispensable to global copper supply chains. Several African countries also possess significant rare earth deposits. Together, these minerals underpin semiconductors, batteries, smartphones, electric vehicles, telecommunications equipment, data centres and the advanced computing infrastructure on which artificial intelligence depends. Yet, as in previous eras of resource extraction, Africa continues to export the raw materials while importing the high-value technologies they make possible.
The implications are profound. In the industrial age, those who controlled factories accumulated wealth. In the information age, those who controlled data accumulated influence. In the age of artificial intelligence, those who control cognition itself—the ability to generate knowledge, process information and automate decision-making—will increasingly shape the international order. Africa is therefore no longer simply competing to digitise. It is competing to ensure that its understanding of itself is not outsourced to algorithms developed elsewhere.
Universities, Constitutional Governance and Africa's Search for Cognitive Sovereignty
If Africa is serious about shaping its place in the age of artificial intelligence, then the conversation must extend far beyond ministries of ICT and technology start-ups. AI is not simply an engineering challenge; it is a governance challenge. It raises fundamental questions about who produces knowledge, whose values are embedded in digital systems and who ultimately exercises power in an increasingly algorithmic society.
One of Africa's enduring development mistakes has been to prioritise acquiring technology over producing knowledge. Governments have celebrated new digital platforms, fibre-optic networks and smart government programmes, yet invested far less in the universities, research institutions and innovation ecosystems that generate indigenous technological capability. The result has been a continent that consumes technology more rapidly than it creates it.
Artificial intelligence exposes the limits of this model. AI systems are not built overnight; they emerge from decades of investment in universities, scientific research, computing infrastructure and public policy. Silicon Valley grew out of research institutions such as Stanford and Berkeley as much as venture capital. As documented by Margaret O'Mara in The Code. China's advances in AI reflect decades of sustained investment in higher education, national laboratories and strategic industrial policy, a trajectory documented by AI Superpowers and reinforced by China's subsequent national AI strategy consistent with analyses by Kai-Fu Lee in AI Superpowers. Even Europe's growing influence stems less from producing dominant AI companies than from shaping global rules through scholarship, law and regulation.
The lesson is simple: digital transformation without knowledge production is unsustainable.
Zimbabwe illustrates both the challenge and the opportunity. Despite years of economic hardship, the country continues to produce highly skilled graduates in engineering, computer science, law, economics and the social sciences. Zimbabwean professionals continue to occupy influential positions across global technology, business and academia. Dr James Manyika serves as Senior Vice President for Research, Technology and Society at Google. Ralph Mupita leads the MTN Group as President and CEO. Strive Masiyiwa built one of Africa's most successful telecommunications companies, while Professor Arthur Mutambara serves as Director of the Institute for the Future of Knowledge at the University of Johannesburg. The problem is not a shortage of talent, but the inability to retain, finance and strategically deploy that talent in support of national development.
The same story can be told across Africa. South African universities remain continental leaders in AI research. Kenya's innovation ecosystem continues to develop globally recognised digital solutions. Nigeria's technology sector has produced companies with international reach, while Rwanda has deliberately positioned itself as a laboratory for digital governance. These examples demonstrate that Africa possesses the intellectual capacity to compete. What has often been lacking is sustained investment, policy coordination and long-term political commitment.
This is precisely why geosociotechnopolitics insists that technology cannot be separated from society or governance. A society that neglects research inevitably becomes dependent on knowledge produced elsewhere. Conversely, societies that invest in research acquire not only technological capability but also strategic autonomy.
The African Union has recognised this reality through its Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy (2025), which seeks to ensure that AI advances African development while reflecting African priorities, values and governance principles. That is an important beginning, but strategies alone will not secure cognitive sovereignty. Governments must treat research and development as strategic investments rather than discretionary expenditure. Universities require modern computing infrastructure, competitive research funding and stronger partnerships with industry. Equally important, Africa must create conditions that encourage its brightest researchers to innovate at home rather than abroad. The challenge is not only economic; it is constitutional.
Throughout this series, I have argued that constitutions are not simply legal texts governing elections or state institutions. They are frameworks for organising power and protecting citizens from its abuse. As artificial intelligence becomes embedded in governance, constitutionalism must evolve alongside technological change.
Consider a future in which AI assists governments to allocate social welfare, identify tax fraud, assess procurement risks or support judicial administration. Such systems may improve efficiency, but they also raise profound constitutional questions. Who is accountable when an algorithm makes a flawed decision? How do citizens challenge automated decisions? How should principles such as equality, transparency and due process apply when decisions are influenced by machine learning systems that even their developers cannot fully explain? These concerns are no longer confined to academic debate. They are reflected in international governance frameworks such as the OECD AI Principles, UNESCO's Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (2021) and the European Union's AI Act, all of which emphasise transparency, accountability, human oversight and the protection of fundamental rights in the development and deployment of AI systems.
These trends are consistent with Zimbabwe's National ICT Policy and recent assessments by UNDP Zimbabwe, which identify artificial intelligence and digital transformation as increasingly important components of the country's development agenda. These concerns are increasingly reflected in international governance frameworks, including the OECD AI Principles, UNESCO's Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (2021) and the European Union's AI Act, all of which emphasise transparency, accountability, human oversight and the protection of fundamental rights in the design and deployment of AI systems.
These are no longer theoretical concerns. Governments around the world are already experimenting with AI-assisted public administration. Africa has an opportunity to ensure that these technologies strengthen democratic governance rather than undermine it.
Zimbabwe's constitutional experience offers an important reminder. The 2013 Constitution emerged from an extensive consultative process intended to anchor governance in constitutionalism, accountability and citizen participation. Those same principles should guide the governance of artificial intelligence. Technology must remain subordinate to constitutional values—not the other way around.
This is why I argue for digital constitutionalism: the application of constitutional principles to emerging digital technologies. Building on the work of legal scholar Giovanni De Gregorio, digital constitutionalism seeks to ensure that constitutional values continue to govern the exercise of power in digital environments. It does not seek to obstruct innovation. Rather, it ensures that technological progress remains consistent with fundamental values such as human dignity, privacy, equality, freedom of expression and democratic accountability. Ultimately, cognitive sovereignty begins not with algorithms but with ideas. It is built in universities, research institutes, policy think tanks and innovation hubs long before it appears in software code. If Africa is to shape the future of artificial intelligence rather than merely consume it, it must first strengthen the institutions that produce knowledge itself.
From Digital Consumers to Architects of Africa's Future
The temptation when discussing artificial intelligence is to focus almost exclusively on technology. We debate algorithms, computing power, large language models and the latest breakthroughs emerging from Silicon Valley or Shenzhen. But history teaches us that societies are not transformed simply because they adopt new technologies. They are transformed because they build the institutions, develop the human capital and exercise the political imagination necessary to govern those technologies in ways that advance national development.
That is where Africa's conversation on artificial intelligence must now begin.
For too long, our digital ambitions have been measured by statistics that tell only part of the story. We celebrate the number of internet users, the kilometres of fibre-optic cable laid, the growth of mobile money and the arrival of another multinational technology company. These are important milestones, but they are not the ultimate measure of digital progress. Infrastructure is the foundation, not the destination.
The real question is whether Africa is becoming a producer of intelligence or merely a sophisticated consumer of intelligence produced elsewhere.
That distinction will define the continent's place in the twenty-first century.
Throughout Africa's post-colonial history, development has often been framed around natural resources, mining and agriculture. Zimbabwe has long been associated with gold, platinum, lithium, diamonds and its historic role as the region's breadbasket. Zambia by copper. Botswana by diamonds. The Democratic Republic of Congo by cobalt. Yet the strategic resource of the digital age is no longer found beneath the ground. It lies in the ability of societies to generate knowledge, produce innovation and govern technology. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and the African Development Bank, Africa occupies a central position in global critical mineral supply chains.
Artificial intelligence makes this reality unmistakable.
The countries shaping the future of AI are not necessarily those with the richest mineral deposits. They are those that have consistently invested in education, scientific research, computing infrastructure and innovation ecosystems. Their greatest asset is not simply technology; it is the institutional capacity to produce new knowledge continuously.
Africa possesses enormous potential. It has the world's youngest population and a growing generation of engineers, computer scientists, lawyers, economists and entrepreneurs. Innovation hubs are expanding across Lagos, Nairobi, Kigali, Cape Town, Cairo and Accra, while Zimbabwe continues to produce professionals whose expertise is recognised globally.
The challenge, therefore, is not capability. It is strategic coordination.
Too often, Africa exports its brightest minds just as it has historically exported its raw materials, with some examples of Zimbabweans mentioned earlier. The continent contributes talent to the world's leading universities and technology companies while struggling to create comparable research ecosystems at home. This intellectual migration mirrors older patterns of economic dependency, where value is created elsewhere from African resources—whether minerals or human capital.
Breaking that cycle requires a different political vision. Governments must begin treating universities as strategic national assets rather than simply teaching institutions. Research and development should be viewed as investments in sovereignty, not discretionary expenditure. If artificial intelligence is becoming the operating system of the global economy, then research capacity is as important to national security today as roads, railways and power stations were during earlier periods of industrialisation.
The private sector also has a critical role. Innovation rarely flourishes in isolation. It emerges where governments, universities, entrepreneurs and investors collaborate around a shared national purpose. Africa has already demonstrated this through mobile financial innovation. Kenya's M-Pesa transformed financial inclusion and inspired digital payment systems across the continent, including Zimbabwe's EcoCash. The next challenge is to replicate that success in artificial intelligence, ensuring that Africa becomes a creator of AI solutions rather than merely a market for them.
This also demands a broader understanding of sovereignty.
For generations, sovereignty was understood primarily in territorial terms. States protected borders, controlled natural resources and exercised authority within defined geographical boundaries. Digital technologies have fundamentally altered that understanding. Today, algorithms developed in California influence conversations in Harare. AI models trained in Beijing support business decisions in Lusaka. Data generated in Bulawayo may be processed on servers located thousands of kilometres away.
Geosociotechnopolitics argues that power is increasingly exercised through technological ecosystems that shape communication, commerce, governance and public opinion. Nations therefore compete not only over territory and resources but also over data, standards, algorithms and digital knowledge. Sovereignty in the digital age is therefore as much intellectual as it is territorial.
This is where cognitive sovereignty assumes its full significance. Cognitive sovereignty is not about technological isolation or digital nationalism. Africa cannot and should not withdraw from global scientific collaboration. Progress has always depended on the exchange of ideas. Rather, cognitive sovereignty means participating in those global networks from a position of confidence rather than dependence. It means ensuring that African societies retain the capacity to define their own priorities, generate their own knowledge and build technologies that reflect their own realities.
Artificial intelligence should increasingly understand African languages, legal traditions, health systems, agricultural practices and cultural contexts—not as afterthoughts, but as integral components of global knowledge production.
The emergence of technomultipolarity provides Africa with a rare historical opportunity. The rules governing artificial intelligence have not yet been settled. International standards remain contested, and competing powers continue to shape different models of digital governance. Africa therefore enters this debate at a moment when meaningful influence is still possible.
The challenge is to move beyond choosing between Washington, Beijing or Brussels. None of these choices, by themselves, constitutes a development strategy. Africa's long-term interests will be better served by building indigenous capability while engaging confidently with every centre of technological innovation.
Zimbabwe, like much of Africa, stands at this crossroads. The decisions taken today about education, research, digital governance and artificial intelligence will shape the country's development trajectory for decades. The question is no longer whether AI will transform Zimbabwean society. That transformation is already underway. The real question is whether Zimbabwe will simply consume it or actively shape it.
That responsibility extends beyond government. Universities must prepare graduates capable of leading AI research. Civil society must engage debates on digital rights, algorithmic accountability and data governance. Legislatures must ensure that emerging technologies remain subject to constitutional oversight.
Above all, African scholars must become more confident producers of ideas. We should not merely apply theories developed elsewhere to African realities. We must increasingly generate concepts capable of explaining our own experience while enriching global scholarship. That conviction lies at the heart of geosociotechnopolitics. It emerged from the recognition that existing frameworks no longer adequately explain the relationship between technology, society and political power in an increasingly digital world.
Ultimately, Africa's digital future will not be determined by the number of data centres it builds or the speed of its internet connections. It will be determined by whether the continent develops the confidence and capacity to become a producer of knowledge rather than merely a consumer of technology.
The struggle for Africa's future has always been about agency—the ability to define our own priorities, imagine our own future and shape the forces transforming our societies. Artificial intelligence has simply moved that struggle into a new arena.
The challenge before us is therefore not simply to build smarter machines.
It is to build smarter societies.
Because in the technomultipolar age, those who shape intelligence will increasingly shape history. The question Africa must answer is not whether it will participate in that future, but whether it will help write it.
Conclusion
Artificial intelligence is often presented as a technological revolution. In reality, it is a governance revolution, reshaping how power is exercised, knowledge is produced and societies make decisions.
For Africa, the challenge is no longer catching up with the digital world. It is ensuring that the continent helps define it. The transition to technomultipolarity provides a rare opportunity because the rules governing AI remain unsettled. African states, universities, innovators and policymakers still have space to shape that future.
That requires a different understanding of sovereignty. Digital sovereignty cannot end with fibre-optic cables, cloud infrastructure or data centres. Those are essential foundations, but the true measure of sovereignty is the ability to produce knowledge, govern emerging technologies and shape the intelligence that increasingly mediates political, economic and social life.
Zimbabwe illustrates both the promise and the challenge. It possesses the talent, entrepreneurial energy and constitutional foundations to become an active participant in Africa's digital future. What is needed is sustained investment in research, stronger collaboration between universities, industry and government, and the confidence to produce ideas rather than simply import them.
That is ultimately what geosociotechnopolitics seeks to explain. Technology is no longer separate from society or politics; it has become one of the principal arenas through which power is exercised. If Africa is to secure genuine cognitive sovereignty, it must become not merely a consumer of artificial intelligence, but a producer of the ideas, institutions and innovations that shape it.
Because in the technomultipolar age, those who shape intelligence will increasingly shape history. The question is not whether Africa will participate in that future, but whether it will help define it. End
About the Author
Dr Blessing Vava is a communication scholar and governance practitioner whose research focuses on artificial intelligence governance, digital sovereignty, constitutionalism and Africa's evolving place in the global digital order. He holds a PhD in Communication Studies from the University of Johannesburg and developed the concept of geosociotechnopolitics to explain the intersection of technology, society and political power. He is the Executive Director of the Southern Africa Coalition for Democracy and Accountability (SACDA) and writes The Thursday Briefing, a bi-weekly commentary on governance, technology and public policy in Africa.
Author's Note
This article builds on ideas developed in my doctoral research on geosociotechnopolitics, which examines the relationship between technology, society and political power in an increasingly digital and multipolar world. It is part of an ongoing series exploring digital sovereignty, constitutional governance and artificial intelligence from an African perspective. The views expressed are my own and are intended to stimulate informed public debate on Africa's role in shaping the governance of emerging technologies. No generative artificial intelligence system was used to develop the article's original arguments, concepts, analysis, or conclusions. Any digital tools used during the research, editing, or publication process served solely as research and editorial aids.
References
• African Union. (2025). Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy.
• Couldry, N., & Mejias, U. A. (2019). The Costs of Connection.
• De Gregorio, G. (2022). Digital Constitutionalism in Europe.
• International Energy Agency. (2024). Global Critical Minerals Outlook.
• Kai-Fu Lee. (2018). AI Superpowers.
• Mazzucato, M. (2013). The Entrepreneurial State.
• O'Mara, M. (2019). The Code: Silicon Valley and the Remaking of America.
• OECD. (2019). OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence.
• Suleyman, M. (2023). The Coming Wave.
• UNESCO. (2021). Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence.
• United States Geological Survey. (2025). Mineral Commodity Summaries.
• World Bank. (2025). Digital Economy for Africa publications.
• Oxford Insights. (2024/2025). Government AI Readiness Index.
Note: The concepts of geosociotechnopolitics and technomultipolarity are drawn from the author's doctoral research on technology, governance and Africa–China digital relations.
No comments:
Post a Comment