Big Tech Can Buy Reach, Not Votes: Lessons for Africa from the US Midterms

Elon Musk and Donald Trump on the South Lawn of the White House beside a Tesla Cybertruck, March 2025

Elon Musk and Donald Trump at a Tesla event on the White House South Lawn, March 2025. Official White House photo by Molly Riley (public domain), via Wikimedia Commons.

By Dr Blessing Vava

“We just proved that all the money in the world is no match for the people of Texas.”

James Talarico said it in his victory speech after defeating Ken Paxton, the Senate candidate backed by Donald Trump and Elon Musk. By mid-October, Musk had contributed more than US$445 million to federal political committees during the election cycle, and in the final four weeks of the Texas race Republicans outspent Democrats on advertising by more than two to one, according to CNN.

The result exposed the limits of that financial advantage, although it is not quite the story of an underdog defeating billionaire money that it first appears.

For Africa, the question is how such influence actually works, and what enables voters to resist it. Campaign spending buys exposure, recommendation systems shape visibility, and platform rules govern access to audiences. None of them guarantees electoral loyalty, but each deserves scrutiny long before polling day, especially when a platform owner is also financing candidates.

The Illusion of Purchased Loyalty

Trump’s relationship with technology billionaires belongs at the centre of this discussion. Because their businesses have a stake in government contracts and regulatory decisions, their political support deserves scrutiny alongside the access they receive.

Wealthy supporters can be dangerously reassuring company for a president. Their businesses may thrive while households struggle, and their enthusiasm can easily obscure how poorly government is responding to ordinary concerns.

Leaders start taking voters for granted when they assume publicity can overcome dissatisfaction. My reading of the American results is that Trump and his allies placed too much faith in their ability to dominate political debate, while voters increasingly judged them on the cost of living and the administration’s record. Early CBS exit polls put Trump’s approval among surveyed voters at 38 per cent, and more voters held negative views of the economy than two years earlier.

Michigan’s senator-elect, Abdul El-Sayed, exposed the gap between campaign rhetoric and everyday life. Answering attacks on his identity, he told supporters: “My name and my faith aren’t the reason you can’t afford your gas.” He had also openly challenged the technology industry. An October campaign advertisement declared: “Big AI is spending big against me, because I’m for taking them on.”

Musk’s own record shows how conspicuous intervention can backfire. During Wisconsin’s 2025 Supreme Court election, he appeared at a rally and handed out two US$1 million cheques, yet his preferred candidate, Brad Schimel, lost to Susan Crawford. Reuters later reported that Musk’s involvement helped energise opposition turnout. His visibility had simply given opponents someone to organise against.

Talarico, for his part, was hardly short of money: his campaign had raised US$146 million by 14 October, according to CNN. He combined those resources with an appeal centred on living costs and concentrated power, while Paxton’s own political liabilities gave dissatisfied voters further reason to look elsewhere. African challengers should study that combination of credibility, organisation and everyday concerns, rather than assume that confronting billionaires is itself a winning strategy.

The results reveal the limits of campaign spending more clearly than those of algorithms. A defeat cannot tell us whether recommendation systems quietly favoured a candidate or narrowed his losing margin, and Musk’s setbacks do not mean the technology industry as a whole has lost influence.

Brazil: Before and After the Count

Lula’s campaign offers a practical lesson in digital mobilisation. Three weeks after losing the first round by 2.2 million votes, he won the runoff, a comeback that EL PAÍS reports no Brazilian candidate had managed before. EXAME reported that André Janones ran a WhatsApp channel with 10.8 million followers, which distributed videos and asked supporters to boost hashtags and recruit others. Supporters were also told not to engage with opponents’ posts, so as not to increase their visibility. They were being organised to shape distribution, not merely to consume content.

Scale did not require deception. When the fact-checking agency Lupa reviewed 721 of the channel’s messages, it found no misinformation about Flávio Bolsonaro, while fact-checkers counted 17 false or distorted posts in the rival channel run by his supporters. African movements can learn from that, provided they build accountable supporter networks, tie online activity to organising on the ground and never mistake virality for persuasion.

The campaign also had to contend with the platforms themselves. According to EL PAÍS, Meta was suppressing the campaign’s posts, a problem attributed to technical faults. Without transparency, no campaign can easily tell a technical fault from a deliberate restriction.

Lula won the presidential runoff with 51.79 per cent of valid votes against Flávio Bolsonaro’s 48.21 per cent, a margin of approximately 4.4 million votes.

After the result, Musk amplified a calculation questioning the outcome and wrote: “Math doesn’t add up.” UOL reported that the calculation failed to account for the increase in valid votes between rounds.

There is an arrogance in treating a result as suspect simply because it defies one’s expectations, particularly when the arithmetic behind the doubt is incomplete. Every result should be open to legitimate challenge, but the fame of the person raising the allegation is no substitute for evidence.

Brazil’s electoral authority published a tool showing how the count developed, allowing citizens and journalists to check claims independently, and the Carter Center’s expert mission commended the administration of the runoff. Measures like these help settle what happened when influential voices dispute an outcome.

South Africa’s dispute with Musk over Starlink concerns connectivity rather than campaign messaging, but it exposes a related problem: how governments regulate companies whose owners also wield political influence. Licensing conditions should be debated openly and applied consistently, and the same principle should govern electoral platforms. Neither commercial importance nor presidential connections should place a provider beyond public scrutiny.

Zambia’s August election showed how fragile such principles become under pressure. After the commission suspended tabulation amid violence at counting centres, EU observers said the transparency of the tabulation process “deteriorated significantly”, even though formal procedures were in place.

Practical Safeguards

Electoral commissions should publish polling-station returns, correction logs and reconciliations between local results and national totals, so that observers can trace exactly how the declared outcome was assembled. Public procedures with platforms should cover impersonation, false voting instructions and account suspensions, with explanations for decisions and meaningful appeals.

Independent scrutiny also requires records showing who financed political advertisements, whom campaigns intended to target and which audiences actually received them. Researchers should examine these alongside moderation decisions and campaign declarations, with safeguards for personal information, and disclosure must extend to the agencies, influencers and third parties through which campaign money flows.

Universities, newsrooms and civil society can investigate coordinated deception and test safeguards in African languages. Election observers should examine these conditions alongside voting and counting.

These protections must apply equally to opposition candidates, citizens and incumbents. Independent enforcement and judicial review are essential, because governments can readily use rules against deception to silence legitimate criticism.

The starting point will differ from country to country. Where their mandates allow, commissions can publish detailed results, correction logs and complaint procedures themselves. Compulsory disclosure by advertisers and third-party campaigners may require legislation and cooperation with data-protection authorities.

Regional bodies can carry what small countries cannot manage alone. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union can negotiate common requirements with platforms, while networks of electoral authorities, such as the Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries, the ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commissions and the Association of African Election Authorities, can pool technical expertise and share lessons across borders. Domestic institutions, however, must remain responsible for enforcement.

A Changing Landscape

Wealthy donors and technology companies may respond more quietly next time, spreading support across parties, concentrating on particular regulatory decisions or channelling resources through less visible organisations. Electoral defeat may change their methods without substantially diminishing their influence.

AI will make that influence harder to see as persuasive material becomes easier to produce and adapt. Kenya has already had a preview. Africa Check documented a fake Citizen TV broadcast that used genuine footage, cloned voices, and manipulated lip movements to make journalists and a doctor appear to promote a bogus cure; it attracted more than 169,000 views on Facebook. Fact-checkers have also caught genuine footage of a party leader overlaid with an AI-generated voice endorsing a governor aspirant. Repeated deception of this kind may eventually lead citizens to dismiss authentic evidence as well.

America and Brazil have shown that concentrated wealth can be defeated at the ballot box. They have not resolved the unequal power that determines who gets heard, who can compete and whose interests shape regulation. For Africa, electoral resilience means being able to trace campaign money, scrutinise platform decisions and independently verify the count.

The test is whether those safeguards remain enforceable when they inconvenience the president, the largest donor or the platform owner. Citizens should not have to depend on a billionaire’s restraint to exercise their political rights. The rules must hold even when the powerful refuse to accept the result.

About the Author

Dr Blessing Vava is a Zimbabwean academic. His work examines elections, digital politics and democratic accountability in Southern Africa, and he co-authored PARI-Africa’s briefings on Zambia’s 2026 general election. He holds a doctorate in Communication Studies from the University of Johannesburg and writes The Thursday Briefing.

 

Who Owns the Algorithm? AI, Africa and the Fight for Digital Sovereignty



Dr Blessing Vava

The Thursday Briefing. Adapted from my Bhawa Lectures talk at The Dome, Moto Republik, Harare, on 29 October 2026.

Open TikTok, Facebook or Instagram and look at the first post on your screen. You didn't ask for it. An algorithm had already picked it for you, based largely on what you watched yesterday, what you liked, what you skipped and how long you lingered.

Most of us rarely stop to think about this. We simply scroll, react and move on. Yet the same systems that choose our videos increasingly help decide which political messages reach voters, which stories dominate public debate and whose voices gradually drop out of sight.

During Zambia's election in August, I watched a fake GEN-20 results form spread across social media. I could clearly see people forwarding it, but I had no way of telling how much, if at all, the platforms' recommendation systems amplified it. We can watch misinformation circulate without ever knowing what the algorithms were doing behind the scenes, and that blind spot is part of the problem.

The same question arose during Brazil's October presidential election, when a dispute between electoral authorities and Meta prompted the electoral court to require equal treatment of the candidates' content. The dispute raised important questions about platform accountability, without proving deliberate algorithmic discrimination.

Across Africa, we have spent years celebrating cheaper smartphones and wider internet access. Connectivity, however, has moved much faster than public oversight. We can get online more easily than ever, yet the rules that decide what reaches us remain largely beyond our control.

We may have access to the platforms, but how much influence do we have over the rules that govern them?

Two terms are worth pinning down first. An algorithm is a set of instructions for completing a task, much like a recipe; for example, sorting names from A to Z. Artificial intelligence refers to computer systems capable of tasks such as recognising patterns, making predictions and generating responses. Many modern AI systems learn patterns from data rather than relying on a separate hand-written rule for every situation. Nobody had to write a rule telling TikTok to show Tendai a particular video. Its recommendation system draws on patterns in what people watch, skip and share. People still decide what the system should aim for, and that is where the question of control begins.

What digital sovereignty means

Digital sovereignty simply means having a real say over the technologies we depend on. It doesn't mean building everything ourselves, and it certainly doesn't mean handing governments more power over citizens. Take a foreign company that runs our national ID system. Sovereignty would mean being able to see how it handles our records, switch suppliers without losing them and quickly correct a record when it is wrong, while citizens remain free to challenge how the system is used. After all, a state can fully control its infrastructure while its people have almost no control over the state, and that is not the sovereignty I am arguing for.

Who decides what we see

I call one part of this the sovereignty of attention. Far more appears online every minute than anyone could possibly read or watch, so something has to decide what gets seen. Newspaper editors and radio producers once made many of those choices, and we at least knew who they were and could argue with them. Today, by contrast, invisible ranking systems make those decisions on a vastly larger scale.

As a result, silencing someone no longer requires banning a newspaper. A platform can simply leave a post online while showing it to fifty people instead of fifty thousand. The speaker remains free to post, but almost nobody hears them.

The real question, then, is who controls that visibility, and whether users or the wider public can challenge it. As I wrote in an earlier Thursday Briefing, 'The algorithm does not know whether you are looking for truth. It only knows that you are looking.'

What appears repeatedly in our feeds can also shape what we come to accept as normal. Schools have a hidden curriculum, the lessons children absorb beyond the timetable, and online feeds teach one too, through what they show and what they leave out. Some people keep appearing as experts while others are constantly presented as problems, and over time those patterns can turn somebody else's assumptions into common sense. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony, I use “mental hegemony” here to describe how algorithmic feeds can make particular assumptions and worldviews seem like common sense. As the Kenyan scholar Nanjala Nyabola reminds us, opening a conversation online does not by itself remove the inequalities that shape who gets heard.

Getting the platforms to account for their decisions is harder still. In October, X suspended more than 13,000 accounts over suspected foreign interference ahead of the US midterms. In Brazil, Lula's campaign alleged that Meta had restricted its reach, while Meta denied unequal treatment and said technical problems were responsible. The electoral court intervened, but that did not establish deliberate bias. Independent scrutiny remains difficult while much of the evidence sits inside the platforms.

That said, we should not respond by handing governments unchecked power over speech. Officials, too, must explain takedowns and allow people to challenge them. Otherwise, rules intended to counter falsehoods can easily become tools against criticism.

Why we end up with the technology we have

My doctoral research on Chinese ICTs in Zimbabwe led me to develop a framework I call geosociotechnopolitics. Debates about technological dependence often begin and end with foreign suppliers. Their influence is undeniably real, but on its own it does not explain why one system takes hold while another does not. To understand that, we also need to examine local needs, the design of the technology and the political decisions that enable its adoption. I bring those forces together through four questions:

• Geo: who is selling it, and what do they want?

• Socio: who is buying it, and what do they need?

• Techno: what does it actually do?

• Politics: who opened the door?

Consider the phone in your pocket. Zimbabweans once dismissed many Chinese phones as zhing zhong, meaning cheap and inferior. Yet in 2023, Transsion, which makes Tecno, Infinix and itel, accounted for roughly half of Africa's smartphone shipments. The company wanted new markets, and millions of Africans needed affordable phones. Features such as dual SIM slots, long battery life and cameras designed to capture darker skin tones met that demand well, and governments, crucially, allowed these products into their markets.

Neither low prices nor Chinese influence alone explains Transsion's success. These phones addressed everyday needs and reached customers through markets that governments had opened to them. That is what geosociotechnopolitics adds. It treats Africans as buyers, users and political actors who make their own choices, and my research on Chinese ICTs in Zimbabwe likewise found a constant interplay between foreign interests and domestic decisions.

Nick Couldry and Ulises A. Mejias call the wider pattern 'data colonialism', meaning data extraction that extends unequal power. My focus is narrower and more practical. I want to know how the four forces combine to make a particular dependency possible and, as a result, where choices can still be changed.

Sovereign in law, dependent in code

With electricity unreliable and data costly, some may reasonably ask why digital sovereignty should be a priority at all. Those are immediate barriers to getting online. Once a school, ministry or household comes to rely on a digital system, though, a different problem arises, and it concerns how much control we actually keep over it.

This is where geosociotechnopolitics meets what I call the governance divide. The framework explains how a system enters our lives, while the divide describes what happens once we depend on it and can use the system but cannot inspect it, repair it or renegotiate the contract. As I wrote in June, 'A country may remain sovereign in law while becoming dependent in code.' We can pass our own laws, yet crucial decisions about IDs, public records and elections may sit inside software controlled elsewhere. We own the house, but someone else holds the keys. Consequently, the time to negotiate access, accountability and the right to leave is before signing the contract, not once switching has become unaffordable.

Who thinks for Africa?

Dependence also affects where we turn for answers. Ask ChatGPT, Gemini or Meta AI on WhatsApp a question, and you will usually get a fluent answer within seconds. Fluency alone, of course, is no proof of accuracy. In 2023, two New York lawyers submitted court cases supplied by ChatGPT that looked entirely convincing but did not exist. The judge fined the lawyers and their firm US$5,000, since checking the sources was their responsibility.

Language brings the problem closer to home. Ask a translation tool to explain the Shona proverb Chara chimwe hachitswanyi inda, meaning one thumb alone cannot crush a louse, and the words may well appear while the meaning disappears. That is amusing with a proverb but genuinely dangerous with medical advice or a legal notice. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o argued that language carries culture, memory and identity, so when AI struggles with Shona, Ndebele or Tonga, we should naturally ask whose knowledge went into its training.

We need researchers who can test these systems in African languages and against African histories, especially before they are used in classrooms or public services. Fortunately, that work is already under way. Masakhane is a grassroots community whose name means 'we build together' in isiZulu, and South Africa's Lelapa AI has developed InkubaLM for isiZulu, isiXhosa, Swahili, Yoruba and Hausa. Shona, Ndebele and Tonga deserve the same attention.

The information we hand over

We often share sensitive information without thinking about where it goes. Someone pastes a confidential report into an AI assistant for a quick summary, a teacher enters pupils' records, and a professional uploads a client's details. Whether that information is retained or used to train a model depends on the service and its settings, and few users ever check before pressing send.

Political information carries particular risks. The Cambridge Analytica scandal exposed the harvesting of data from as many as 87 million Facebook users through a personality quiz for political profiling. The company was also active in African politics. Its executives discussed work in Kenyan elections, while reporting linked it to Nigeria's 2015 election. More recently, on 21 October 2026, in a New Mexico consumer-protection case connected to the Cambridge Analytica revelations, a New Mexico judge ordered Meta to pay US$25 billion after a jury found it had misled users. Meta says it will appeal.

Our national ID databases, clinic records and tax files deserve equally serious scrutiny, and we should demand answers from our own governments as firmly as we do from Meta or Google.

I was reminded of this at Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport, when I used the self-service passport scanner. It worked in seconds, but I later wondered where that information went and who could access it. The scanner may not use AI, but it is part of the digital machinery on which public services now depend. A foreign supplier is not evidence of wrongdoing. Even so, we have a right to know who can see our records and who can correct a mistake when a flight is boarding.

Who answers when it goes wrong

Kenya shows what happens when institutions decide to act. In 2023, Worldcoin, a project co-founded by OpenAI's Sam Altman, set up biometric-scanning 'orbs' in Nairobi, and thousands queued to have their eyes scanned in exchange for crypto tokens worth about US$50. Kenya suspended the operation that August. Then, in May 2025, the High Court ordered Worldcoin to delete the data it had collected from Kenyans, under the Data Protection Commissioner's supervision. The intervention ultimately depended on a law, a regulator willing to act, and a court able to enforce its decision.

New Mexico's action against Meta points the same way, showing that a jurisdiction can require a global platform to answer legal claims. Neither case proves that regulation always succeeds, but both show why credible regulators, courts and enforceable rights matter. Zimbabweans use the same platforms, so it is fair to ask whether our own institutions have the independence and resources to hold them to account.

Nor is African ownership a guarantee. A locally owned platform can suppress dissent or misuse personal data just as readily as a foreign one. Sovereignty should accordingly be judged by what people can know, contest and change, whoever happens to own the system.

Where Africa stands

Africa's choices are constrained in three ways, by infrastructure, expertise and enforcement. Take infrastructure first. Huawei has built significant parts of the continent's telecoms networks, while Meta and Google have invested in undersea cables. Such investment can certainly expand access, but it is worth asking how much say we retain over services that are difficult to replace.

The second constraint is expertise. Suppliers now come from China, America, Europe, India, the Gulf and Africa itself, but having options helps only if our universities, regulators, public officials and journalists can properly evaluate the technology and the contracts.

The third is enforcement. Zimbabwe has a Cyber and Data Protection Act, with POTRAZ serving as the data protection authority, but whether it can effectively investigate and challenge a global platform is still an open question. Across Africa, 39 countries now have data protection laws, and their value ultimately depends on whether people can use them to seek redress.

The free AI test

Suppose a company offered every public school in Zimbabwe a free AI assistant. Most of us would be tempted to say yes on the spot. It is worth slowing down first.

I would start by asking what the company gets out of it. It may genuinely want to help, but free products have a way of opening markets, collecting data and making the next contract hard to turn down, so it pays to know what comes after the gift.

Then I would think about the schools themselves. Not the ones in Harare where the launch would happen, but a school in Binga or Mutoko, where the electricity comes and goes, forty pupils share a single device and many children ask their questions in Tonga, Ndebele or Shona. A polished demonstration in the capital tells us very little about whether the tool will help in a classroom like that.

I would also want to know what the assistant actually does, whether children learn more with it, where it gets things wrong, and what they might stop learning to do for themselves if they lean on it.

Finally, I would ask who said yes, and on what terms. A ribbon-cutting ceremony cannot tell us whether anyone at the ministry read the contract carefully or looked at other options.

Those are the four questions at work, and engineers and officials cannot answer them alone. Teachers, parents and learners should have a say, because they are the ones who will live with the decision.

How we fight for digital sovereignty

Africa is hardly alone here. Even Europe, with its wealth and strict data rules, depends on external suppliers for much of its digital infrastructure and services, and the European Parliament has discussed estimates that Europe relies on non-EU providers for over 80 per cent of its digital products, services, infrastructure and intellectual property. In June 2026, the European Commission proposed measures to strengthen technological sovereignty, covering chips, cloud computing, AI and open-source alternatives, and Europe has set a target of a 20 per cent share of the global chip market by 2030. The European Parliament has even moved from Google towards the French search engine Qwant. We cannot simply copy Europe's approach, but its debate shows that control over technology is a political choice, and one that even wealthy regions have to fight for.

Merely criticising Silicon Valley and Beijing is not a plan, and companies will not surrender control of profitable systems simply because we ask. At the same time, replacing foreign influence with unchecked state power would solve little. Digital sovereignty must give African governments the capacity to negotiate with global technology companies while ensuring that citizens can question how those technologies are used.

We can begin with the contracts our governments sign. When a ministry purchases facial recognition technology, a digital ID system or an AI service, the public should know who supplied it, what it costs, who can access the information and what happens when the contract expires. We should also be asking whether the government can change suppliers without losing access to its own data. These are questions that ought to be settled before contracts are signed, not when a country discovers that leaving has become too expensive.

But transparency means little without people who understand the technology. Africa needs computer scientists, linguists, lawyers and researchers who can independently examine the systems being introduced into our societies. A Zimbabwean university could test an AI assistant by asking it 200 questions in Shona about farming, health, education and the law, then publish the answers and explain the mistakes. We would have evidence of how well it serves Shona speakers, beyond what its developers promise.

We also need to make better use of the laws and institutions we already have. South Africa's Protection of Personal Information Act and Kenya's Data Protection Act provide safeguards concerning certain forms of automated decision-making. Ahead of South Africa's 2024 elections, its Electoral Commission worked with major technology platforms to address disinformation. These arrangements matter, but their value ultimately depends on whether citizens can challenge decisions, regulators can investigate complaints and courts can enforce the law. Passing legislation is one thing. Making it work for ordinary people is another.

There is also a strong case for regional cooperation. Why should Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi negotiate expensive technology contracts separately when they face many of the same challenges? Through SADC and the African Union, countries could pool technical expertise, agree on minimum standards for public technology procurement and negotiate better terms with suppliers. The African Union's Continental AI Strategy already provides a foundation for cooperation on AI governance, infrastructure, research and skills development. We often say chara chimwe hachitswanyi inda. The proverb is just as relevant to digital governance as it is to everyday life.

None of this will amount to much if digital sovereignty simply transfers power from foreign corporations to a small group of political and economic elites at home. An African-owned platform can suppress dissent, and a government-controlled database can be used to monitor citizens. What matters is whether people have the right to know how these systems operate, question decisions made about them and seek redress when something goes wrong.

Ultimately, we need governments strong enough to negotiate with global technology companies, but also citizens and institutions strong enough to hold those governments accountable.

So, who owns the algorithm?

Owning data means little if people have no say in how it is collected, read and used. The real questions, therefore, are who benefits when a system makes a decision, who can challenge that decision, and who has the power to put things right when it goes wrong.

Next time you open your phone, look at the first video in your feed. Someone built the system that put it there and decided what it should reward. Those same choices, however, matter far more when software shapes what children learn in class, what a nurse sees on a hospital screen, or which political messages reach voters.

Decisions like these should not be left to technology companies, nor should they be handed to governments that answer to no one. Instead, we need the expertise to question the systems we buy, the bargaining power to set fair terms and institutions strong enough to enforce them. Above all, people need to be able to challenge the decisions that shape their lives. Indeed, if Africans cannot question the systems that govern their digital lives, whose sovereignty are we really defending?

Dr Blessing Vava is a Zimbabwean governance researcher. He holds a doctorate in Communication Studies from the University of Johannesburg, where his research examined the diffusion of Chinese information and communication technologies in Zimbabwe and their implications for politics and society. He developed the concept of geosociotechnopolitics to explain how geopolitics, technology, social conditions and domestic political choices shape technological adoption. He is the founder of the Southern Africa Coalition for Democracy and Accountability (SACDA), where his work focuses on democracy, electoral governance, digital sovereignty and regional accountability

Further reading and key references

Couldry, N., & Mejias, U. A. (2019). The Costs of Connection: How Data Is Colonizing Human Life and Appropriating It for Capitalism. Stanford University Press.

Cyber and Data Protection Act [Chapter 12:07] (Zimbabwe), 2021.

Data Protection Act No. 24 of 2019 (Kenya), section 35.

Lelapa AI (2024). InkubaLM: A small language model for low-resource African languages.

Masakhane.

Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o (1986). Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. James Currey.

Nyabola, N. (2018). Digital Democracy, Analogue Politics: How the Internet Era Is Transforming Kenya. Zed Books.

Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 (South Africa), section 71.

Vava, B. (2024). All Weather Friend? Chinese ICTs in Zimbabwe as General Purpose Technologies. DLitt et Phil thesis, University of Johannesburg.

Vava, B. (2026, 24 June). Beyond Infrastructure: Digital Sovereignty and the Politics of Ownership in Africa's Technomultipolar Age.

Vava, B. (2026, 15 October). Elon Musk's X Suspends 13,000 Accounts, Raising Questions for African Elections.

Vava, B. (2026, September). When the Algorithm Decides What We See: Who Governs Digital Democracy?

Vava, B. The Passport, the Database and the State: Who Controls Digital Zimbabwe?

Vava, B. Who Thinks for Africa? AI, Geosociotechnopolitics and the Battle for Cognitive Sovereignty.


Elon Musk’s X Suspends 13,000 Accounts, Raising Questions for African Elections

Illustration: Digital platforms, electoral integrity and the struggle for digital sovereignty in Africa.

The ThursdayBriefing 14/10/2026

By Dr Blessing Ivan Vava

X says it has suspended more than 13,000 accounts linked to suspected foreign influence operations ahead of the United States midterm elections on 3 November. In its announcement on 14 October, the company said networks associated with Iran, Russia and China used fake accounts to post and amplify political content targeting candidates and public figures across the political spectrum.

Removing deceptive accounts may help protect an election. But the announcement also reminds us how much authority a private platform exercises over political debate. X investigates suspicious activity, decides which accounts to remove and explains its decisions largely on its own terms. The public has limited access to the evidence behind those decisions.

African countries should pay attention before the next election dispute. Political parties, candidates, civic organisations and ordinary citizens use these platforms to organise, campaign and reach voters. Decisions taken thousands of kilometres away can determine whether their messages are heard at home.

Suppose X suspends an African opposition political party’s accounts days before voting, describing them as part of an influence operation. The party disputes the accusation; however, where can it obtain a timely, independent hearing? Restoring its accounts after polling would not recover the lost campaign days.

The latest announcement does not establish that X targeted legitimate political parties or that Elon Musk personally ordered the removals. Yet political participation should not depend on the goodwill of Musk or any other platform owner. Safeguards against selective enforcement matter regardless of who owns the company.

None of this means online deception should be tolerated. During Kenya’s 2022 election, a fabricated graphic circulated claiming to show a joint media tally declaring Raila Odinga the winner. Africa Check also investigated a fake news screenshot alleging that thousands of votes had wrongly been added to his total. Both borrowed the appearance of familiar news sources.

A voter receiving such a graphic from a trusted relative on WhatsApp may forward it without checking. By the time a correction arrives, people could already be arguing about why the electoral commission’s figures differ from what they believe they have seen. Even if no result changes, public confidence can be shaken while votes are still being counted. Election observation can no longer stop at the polling station; it must also pay attention to the information reaching voters online.

Platforms have a responsibility to confront coordinated deception. Ahead of Uganda’s January 2021 election, Facebook (now Meta) removed a network of accounts and pages for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. The company later reported that its investigation found links to a government communications centre. That example shows why the scrutiny cannot be directed only at foreign actors: domestic political power can also be implicated in online manipulation.

Still, an activist using a pseudonym for safety is not the same as an operation pretending to be hundreds of unrelated citizens. Nor is a political party’s organised campaign automatically deceptive. These distinctions matter where accusations of foreign interference or misinformation could put legitimate critics at risk.

There is another, less visible way platforms exercise power. X’s published rules allow it to restrict the reach of posts, including by excluding them from search results and recommendations.

Imagine a candidate publishing evidence of a failed public project. The post stays on their profile but barely travels beyond existing supporters. The candidate may never learn whether voters simply lost interest, the algorithm favoured other material, or the post was quietly restricted for breaking a rule. Ordinary ranking and a penalty are very different things, but without meaningful transparency they look the same from the outside.

A platform can therefore affect a campaign without closing its accounts. Voters may never know what they were not shown. That is why researchers need ways to examine suspected discriminatory enforcement and the broader effects of recommendation systems, with proper privacy safeguards.

This is where digital sovereignty matters for African elections. Who holds these companies accountable when their decisions affect political participation? African institutions must be able to demand explanations, while candidates and citizens need somewhere to challenge decisions that could affect an election. Closer cooperation with Big Tech means little without transparency, accountability and protection of political rights. African countries cannot claim sovereignty over their elections while powerful companies make consequential decisions about electoral debate without adequate scrutiny.

There is also the danger that governments could abuse such cooperation for political advantage. An agreement supposedly intended to protect elections from misinformation could become a convenient route for those in power to flag their opponents’ material. Criticism of a president or ruling party might be reported as misinformation, with posts restricted or accounts suspended. Those affected may not know whether a decision followed a government complaint or the platform’s own assessment. By the time they secure an explanation or appeal, the election may already be over.

Government requests to technology companies are already a documented practice. Google publishes information about removal requests from courts and public agencies, including requests to review content under its own policies. A request does not necessarily lead to removal.

African governments should disclose the purpose and procedures of election-related arrangements with platforms. Requests affecting political speech should be recorded and subject to independent scrutiny. Citizens gain little if authority simply shifts from a company acting alone to a company acting alongside an incumbent government.

Electoral commissions need direct channels to report fabricated results and misleading voting instructions. But they should not be the only ones with access to the platforms. Independent observers and civic organisations must also be heard, particularly when political accounts are suspended. An appeal resolved after polling day offers little comfort to a candidate who has already lost valuable campaign time.

African countries should not have to negotiate these matters individually with powerful technology companies. The African Union (AU) and regional bodies such as SADC and the East African Community (EAC) could establish common expectations on transparency, political content moderation and electoral accountability. Election observers also need to understand what is happening online, including conversations in local languages that international platforms may struggle to interpret. Independent researchers need access to relevant evidence, with privacy safeguards, to assess whether suspected influence operations actually reached voters.

X’s announcement should prompt more than a debate about 13,000 accounts removed ahead of America’s midterms. African electoral authorities need to ask what would happen if a similar operation targeted their elections, how they would assess the company’s response, and where affected citizens or parties could turn for redress. Those questions should be settled before the next campaign, not in the middle of a dispute.

The future of democratic elections will be decided as much in the weeks before polling day as in the count itself. Ballots may be secret and tallies accurate, yet an election can still be unfair if one side’s message was quietly suppressed or the other side’s falsehoods travelled unchecked. Electoral integrity has always meant protecting the vote. It must now also mean protecting the conditions under which voters make up their minds, and that requires scrutiny of companies whose decisions never appear on the ballot.

If an African political party loses access to its supporters days before voting, a platform’s assurance that it acted to protect the election will not be enough. The decision may be justified, but the party needs a fair opportunity to challenge it before the damage becomes irreversible. That is what digital sovereignty should mean for voters: institutions that can demand answers from powerful companies, even when their owners are beyond our borders.

The ballot will still record the voter’s choice. We also need to know who had the power to restrict the debate that preceded it, and what stopped them from abusing that power.

Dr Blessing Ivan Vava is a Zimbabwean political analyst and Executive Director of the Southern Africa Coalition for Democracy and Accountability (SACDA). His work examines elections, digital politics and democratic accountability in Southern Africa, and he recently co-authored PARI-Africa’s briefings on Zambia’s 2026 general election. He holds a doctorate in Communication Studies from the University of Johannesburg and writes The Thursday Briefing at blevava.blogspot.com.


Zimbabwe’s Wicknell Chivayo: The Patron Is Gone, the Patronage Remains


Zimbabwe mourned a tenderpreneur, a businessman enriched by government contracts, as though it had lost a cabinet minister. That tells us less about the man than about the state that made him possible.

     Wicknell Chivayo with Kenyan President William Ruto. Credit: Sir Wicknell Facebook page

By Dr Blessing Ivan Vava

The immigration officer in Nairobi was still holding my passport when, learning I was Zimbabwean, he suggested Kenya had lost Wicknell, the president’s friend.

He seemed not quite to believe the man was dead. During my short stay, Wicknell’s name came up at almost every introduction. Some Kenyans spoke of his generosity; others of corruption, Rolls-Royces and the imagined riches of Zimbabwean men. Before I could explain what brought me to Kenya, the conversation turned to him. Kenyan colleagues told me his death had dominated media coverage.

I found myself wondering how one man’s presidential friendships and conspicuous wealth had become such a recognisable image of Zimbabwe abroad.

Chivayo, the self-styled “Sir Wicknell”, died with his wife Lucy Muteke and three others when their helicopter crashed in Marondera on 30 September. Every family that lost someone that day deserves compassion. But a public life invites a public reckoning, and the response to his death was itself a political event.

When public services fail, and wages cannot sustain a household, a wealthy patron gains power over people’s choices. Chivayo’s gifts came with publicity, and his political loyalties were explicit. Why had citizens’ livelihoods and dignity become so dependent on the favour of men with access to President Emmerson Mnangagwa?

The informal foreign ministry

His reach went far beyond Mnangagwa. He met Kenya’s William Ruto, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, Tanzania’s Samia Suluhu Hassan and Nigeria’s Bola Tinubu, and cultivated a relationship with King Mswati III of Eswatini. Samia was reported to have visited the family home to pay her condolences. What was a private tenderpreneur doing with such ready access to heads of state, and what public scrutiny accompanied it?

Eswatini’s government confirmed that he had been granted citizenship and a diplomatic passport following his audience with King Mswati III in June, citing his “philanthropic contributions”. It also announced that Intratrek, the company at the centre of the Gwanda dispute, would build a 3 billion South African rand solar plant in the kingdom. In Kenya, his name appeared on a leaked immigration list allegedly showing passports issued to foreign nationals, prompting lawyer Peter Wahinya to demand the application records. Each government owes its citizens an explanation of the privileges it granted him and any public business conducted through those relationships.

Former Kenyan Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua alleged that Chivayo held and moved money on Ruto’s behalf. The reports supplied no evidence substantiating those allegations. Chivayo had nevertheless become a figure in Kenya’s disputes about presidential power as well as Zimbabwe’s.

When Ruto personally drove him to a helipad in August, Chivayo publicised the encounter. One Kenyan I spoke to saw it as evidence of his importance. The photographs told us who would receive him, but little about the businesses financing his lifestyle and gifts.

At home, the mourners included politicians, pastors, musicians, comedians, sports stars, civil servants, and judges from the Supreme Court and High Court. Ministers came in procession. Presidential adviser Paul Tungwarara recalled frequent meetings with Mnangagwa involving himself and Chivayo. Justice Minister Ziyambi Ziyambi also recalled regularly finding Chivayo at the president’s private office. The president visited the family himself, and Chivayo was declared a provincial hero.

Citizens seeking a hearing about nurses’ pay, water supplies or public expenditure rarely command such visible attention. Watching the succession of ministers visiting the family, it felt as though almost the whole government had stopped to mourn. The accounts left me wondering whether a small circle of businessmen enjoyed more ready access to Mnangagwa than his own ministers. Citizens should know where public decisions are made and whose interests are heard.

Nobody begrudges a family its grief. What grates is the public celebration of a model of success whose rewards were always on display and whose workings never were.

Follow the five million

The Gwanda solar project is where the questions become concrete. Chivayo’s company, Intratrek, won a major public contract that led to litigation and criminal proceedings, in which he and the company were acquitted. That must be accepted. But an acquittal answers a criminal charge. It does not answer the auditor’s question: what did the public pay, and what did it receive?

At the funeral, his younger brother Joachim "G6" Chivayo gave an account of what followed the Gwanda payment.  His story drew laughter, but it deserved scrutiny. He recalled that once the US$5 million arrived, Wicknell stopped taking his calls. Joachim followed his brother’s movements on Facebook instead: shoes he valued at US$90,000 and a trip to America. When they finally spoke, Wicknell said the money was finished. The US$1 million promised to Joachim had become a car. Joachim called it his brother’s “hustling mentality”. The mourners laughed.

By his brother’s own account, Wicknell broke his word to the man who had sold his cars to back him. But this was not family money. It was paid for a public power project, under a contract ZPC terminated in 2018. G6’s story does not establish where those funds went. It does make the question impossible to dodge. If a brother who trusted him could not get a straight answer about the money, Zimbabweans are entitled to one from the records: what happened to the money, and what did the public receive for it?

Then there are the recordings that surfaced during his feud with Mike Chimombe and Moses Mpofu. In audio attributed to him, the speaker boasts of presidential trust while discussing a maize-supply contract and other government business. Chivayo disputed their authenticity, alleging voice cloning. In the world described by those recordings, trust from “mukuru”, a Shona term of respect for an elder or boss, widely taken to mean Mnangagwa, appears to count for more than competitive bidding. The allegations require independent examination against procurement and payment records. Friendship is not an audit.

The cars and the constitution

Constitutional Amendment No. 3, commonly known as CAB3, brought the political consequences into focus. The amendment extended presidential terms from five to seven years and replaced direct presidential elections with selection by Parliament. CITE, a Bulawayo-based news outlet, reported that Samantha Mureyani of the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) and Remigious Matangira of the ruling ZANU-PF each received a 2026 Toyota Fortuner and US$50,000 from Chivayo while publicly backing the bill. According to that report, Chivayo linked the rewards to their support.

A legislator watching those gifts could reasonably conclude that support for the next amendment might attract similar generosity. Parliament should have examined that risk, regardless of whether a particular vote could be shown to have been purchased.

There was also an offer to the whole of Parliament. On 18 April, Independence Day, Chivayo pledged US$3.6 million: US$10,000 for each of the 360 MPs and senators, opposition included, for “constituency development”, to be handed over through Speaker Jacob Mudenda. He called it an “olive branch” and claimed Mnangagwa had personally approved it. There was a catch. Any legislator who refused would see the money go instead to a “competent and pro-development individual” in their constituency: a former MP, a shadow MP, an aspiring rival. The pledge did not mention the constitutional amendment. It did not need to. The vote was weeks away.

Refusal had a price: turn down the patron’s money and fund your challenger. What independence could Parliament claim when a government contractor, invoking the president’s blessing, was offering money to its members weeks before they voted on that president’s powers?

Bulawayo Mayor David Coltart pointed to Parliament’s Code of Conduct, which prohibits MPs from promoting matters for personal benefit and requires disclosure of gifts exceeding US$4,500. He also argued that Parliament had not fulfilled the broader disclosure requirements of Section 198 of the Constitution. The public should be able to inspect the members’ interests register and see whether these gifts were declared. Disclosure is the starting point for scrutiny, rather than a substitute for it.

Chivayo’s own political preference was explicit. In a Facebook post published on the morning of the crash, he wrote: “EVERYDAY isu tachinja slogan yave VISION 2040.” The post declares that the slogan is now “Vision 2040”. He had also publicly connected CAB3 with that ambition. Set that beside the Munhumutapa imagery surrounding the president, which recalls the emperors of the pre-colonial Mutapa state, and I read this as support for a presidency with no foreseeable end. The concern is that the presidency is increasingly presented as belonging to a person instead of being an office held in public trust.

The economy of gratitude

A car can leave its recipient feeling indebted long after the handover. Gratitude and the hope of another gift raise the cost of criticising the benefactor or his political associates. People who depend on the next gift can feel obliged to support politics they would otherwise question.

His giving also reached the institutions entrusted with enforcing the law. Last December, The Herald reported a donation package worth about US$5.6 million for the army, police and prison service’s welfare funds: 20 Land Cruisers and US$2 million in cash. In August, he offered CID Homicide ten bulletproof Fortuners, US$250,000 in tactical equipment and an iPhone for every officer in the department, subject to official approval. Its detectives had investigated the armed robbery at his in-laws’ farm. Could an ordinary citizen trust the same department to investigate a complaint against him without fear or favour? The security services should disclose what they accepted, who benefited and how they protected their independence.

The spectacle of “twerking for cars” revealed how little ordinary work seemed to offer. People made public appeals and performed for Chivayo’s attention because being noticed could change their circumstances. Mocking them avoids the harder question of why they needed to do so. A functioning economy should allow people to earn decent livelihoods without auditioning for a benefactor.

Advocate Lewis Uriri drew that boundary last month when he declined Chivayo’s public offer of a US$250,000 Range Rover and US$100,000 in cash for him and his wife. Uriri said his past legal work had been fully remunerated and rejected gifts that could create a perception of continuing financial obligation. ZimLive also reported footage of him accepting an earlier vehicle. His later refusal nevertheless recognised the danger of financial obligation outlasting a professional relationship.

Not every beneficiary surrendered their independence. But the churches, newsrooms and artists who accepted his generosity should ask honestly whether they still feel free to say what this article says. Ubuntu, an ethic of shared humanity, protects the dignity of the receiver, including the freedom to disagree. Generosity turns corrosive when criticism is rebranded as ingratitude.

Chivayo’s death leaves intact the political arrangements that enabled his rise. Zimbabwe Power Company should publish the Gwanda payment and delivery records, and the Auditor-General should establish what the public received for its money. Parliament should disclose MPs’ gifts and interests during the CAB3 proceedings and examine whether those gifts breached its rules.

Churches, media houses and civic bodies receiving large donations should disclose them and explain how they protect their independence.

Accountability also extends beyond Zimbabwe. Eswatini should disclose the basis for granting him citizenship and a diplomatic passport, and publish the proposed solar project’s terms and procurement process. Kenya’s immigration authorities should answer the questions already put to them about his reported passport. Presidents who received him should explain what public business, if any, arose from those relationships. Mourning cannot close the public record.

In Nairobi, his name became my introduction to Zimbabwe. The work at home is to build a country recognised for institutions that serve its people. Zimbabweans should not have to become anyone’s favourite to be treated as citizens. 

Dr Blessing Ivan Vava is a Zimbabwean political analyst and Executive Director of the Southern Africa Coalition for Democracy and Accountability (SACDA). He writes on democracy, governance and Southern African politics. He can be contacted at blessingvava@gmail.com


Trump’s AI Ambitions Demand a Clearer Response from Africa

The ThursdayBriefing 8 October 2026

By Dr Blessing Ivan Vava

Donald Trump’s administration was clear about whose future it was celebrating. As the US president gathered technology executives at the White House on September 29, his officials hailed a coming “Golden Age”. The same day, Trump signed an executive order directing federal agencies to use “super intelligence” instead of “artificial intelligence” in official communications, to the extent permitted by law. Watching from Africa, I was struck by how plainly the ambition was stated. These companies may serve the world, but the political project has a national address.

The gathering produced the White House Accord on Super Intelligence, signed by Trump and leaders from Google, Anthropic, Meta, OpenAI, xAI and Nvidia. It sets out voluntary commitments to internal controls, external audits and board oversight. Trump called it “morally binding”. The document leaves open the possibility of legislation later.

Decisions made by the US government and major AI suppliers will shape which systems African health and education ministries, public hospitals and schools can buy, and on what terms. The accord names cybersecurity, biosecurity and chemical threats among its concerns. It offers no explicit route to redress for a patient harmed by an AI-assisted decision or a child poorly served by an AI tutor. African governments should ensure that national laws and procurement contracts protect those using these systems. Health and education authorities should enforce standards, while independent regulators and courts provide avenues for complaints and remedies.

Trump knows what he wants AI to deliver for America. The harder question is whether African governments know what they want before they sign a technology agreement.

Washington has put its intentions in writing. A July 2025 executive order seeks worldwide adoption of American AI technologies, standards and governance models. It backs exports of complete technology packages, from computing infrastructure to applications, and explicitly aims to reduce dependence on technologies developed by US adversaries. Selling technology is part of a strategy for extending American power. At the White House meeting, Trump put the rivalry plainly: “We have a very big lead, and we’re going to keep our lead.” He has also resisted sweeping federal regulation on the grounds that it could slow American innovation and benefit China.

China’s Global AI Governance Action Plan offers another route, promising open-source cooperation and support for the Global South. Those promises deserve the same scrutiny as Washington’s. Open-source tools may be difficult to put to lasting use if local institutions lack the expertise to adapt them or the money to maintain them. Still, credible alternatives from Chinese suppliers could give African governments more room to negotiate better terms with American companies. 

That leverage is greatest before a contract is signed and can vanish soon after. Suppose Zimbabwe's Ministry of Health and Child Care buys an AI system to support patient care in public hospitals. Once patient records and daily services run on that supplier's software, replacing it requires costly data transfers and retraining staff. If fees rise, the ministry may simply pay, because switching would disrupt treatment. One procurement decision can narrow the choices of future governments.

Such dependence can be built into contracts, where a government’s need to improve public services meets a supplier’s commercial interests. I examine these encounters through geosociotechnopolitics, a framework that connects local needs and political choices with the ambitions of powers such as the US and China. African officials may have limited bargaining power and face pressure to secure investment quickly. They still need to establish who controls the system and where the data goes, and ensure that citizens have someone to hold to account.

These questions surfaced in Zimbabwe’s 2018 facial-recognition partnership with CloudWalk. Contemporary reporting described plans for Zimbabwean facial data to help train the Chinese company’s systems. MISA Zimbabwe raised concerns about the anticipated transfer and called for parliamentary scrutiny. Those reports do not establish what data was ultimately transferred. They do show why consent and oversight belong in the discussion before a partnership proceeds.

The supplier’s nationality cannot settle these questions. An American product carries no automatic guarantee of accountability, just as a Chinese agreement does not by itself establish dependence. The terms of the deal matter, along with the institutions responsible for enforcing them.

Connecting schools and training teachers to use an AI tutor may leave an education ministry dependent on software it cannot properly assess or adapt. Teachers might notice that it gives poor answers in Shona, but who can investigate the problem and get it corrected? That requires local expertise and an agreement that gives the ministry a say over how the system is used. Teachers should have time to test the tutor against the curriculum before purchase, and their findings should influence the decision. Otherwise, once schools rely on it, officials could struggle to resist higher fees or proposed changes to the use of pupils’ data. This is the governance divide that concerns me: expanding access without giving public institutions the means to protect the people using the technology.

For a district hospital in rural Malawi, an AI tool that helps interpret scans could ease pressure on scarce specialist services. Before accepting such an offer, hospital managers and clinicians would need evidence that it works reliably for their patients. They would also need to establish where patient records would be stored, who could access them and who would remain responsible for clinical decisions. If the supplier withdrew the service, the hospital would still need a way to assess and treat patients.

Africa has policy foundations for this work. The African Union’s Continental AI Strategy, endorsed in July 2024, calls for an Africa-centred approach and cooperation among member states. The Malabo Convention on cybersecurity and personal data protection entered into force in 2023. The AU also has a Data Policy Framework. Turning these commitments into effective oversight requires public institutions with staff, budgets and the authority to act.

Procurement offers an immediate starting point. Before signing a major agreement, a government should require evidence that the system works in its intended setting, clear limits on the use of sensitive information and a practical way to change providers. Independent scrutiny at this stage could prevent years of avoidable dependence.

Smaller countries need not shoulder every cost alone. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) could help member governments share the cost of technical teams to evaluate AI systems and advise on contracts. Universities within these regions could pool computing resources and contribute researchers to those teams. Officials would then have access to expertise independent of the company seeking their signature.

Hospital staff might leave a training workshop knowing how to use an AI system, yet still have nobody locally to turn to when it produces questionable results. That is a limited return on the promise of capacity building. Paying domestic firms to develop and maintain applications would help build expertise that institutions could draw on long after the training ends. Universities also need sustained access to computing resources to test tools in Shona, Swahili or Chichewa. Much of that investment could be lost if public institutions cannot afford to keep trained staff. Governments should ask what their institutions will be able to do for themselves once the supplier’s team has gone home. The answer need not be a home-grown ChatGPT. It should at least include enough expertise to recognise a poor offer and negotiate a better one.

Citizens also need protection from their own governments. Putting an AI system under national control does not, by itself, prevent officials from using facial recognition to track critics or algorithms to deny public services without explanation. People need a way to challenge those decisions, backed by independent oversight and enforceable limits on state power. Otherwise, sovereignty may merely change who holds the power to misuse the technology.

Trump has put American power behind the AI industry. African leaders should be able to explain what their own agreements are for, and remain answerable for them years later. When a hospital’s system fails, it matters whether help is available locally. A university should have more to show for a partnership than staff trained to use somebody else’s software. Citizens have a right to know what these deals cost and who has access to their data, long after the officials who signed them have left office.

America is entitled to pursue its golden age. Africa’s task is to negotiate a future its own citizens have reason to welcome. 

Dr Blessing Ivan Vava is a Zimbabwean researcher and Executive Director of the Southern Africa Coalition for Democracy and Accountability (SACDA). His work examines technology, sovereignty and democratic accountability in Africa. He holds a doctorate in Communication Studies from the University of Johannesburg, where he researched Chinese ICT investment in Zimbabwe, and writes The Thursday Briefing on his blog, The Vuvuzela Times.